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Common Sense and the Commerce Clause:
Why Elimination of the Physical Presence Test for
Taxation Defies Both
Lucas Humble'

INTRODUCTION

A

recurring nightmare of every attorney is learning about personal
jurisdiction in law school. Picking apart Pennoyer2 from International
Shoe3 and BurgerKing4 from Asahi5 is enough to challenge even the brightest
legal scholars. As a reward for trudging through the morass of jurisdictional
issues (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grasped firmly in hand), secondand third-year law students earn the right to take Taxation, complete with
its maze of codes and regulations.
Despite the endless complications and (seemingly incomprehensible)
proposition that a hybrid of Civil Procedure and Taxation presents, the
Supreme Court of the United States deftly navigated the waters and
produced a bright-line rule of simplification and common sense: a state
cannot impose a tax on an out-of-state business entity unless that entity
has some physical presence within the state.6 This rule has remained valid
law for decades; however, due to Justice Stevens's ambiguous language
in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,7 courts and state legislatures have ignored
I J.D. anticipated 2012, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.S. 2009, Western Kentucky University. The author would like to thank his wife, Chelsea Humble, for her constant
support and encouragement.
2 Pennoyer v. Neff, 9 5 U.S. 714 (1877).
3 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

4 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
5 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
6 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306, 311 (1992); Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Dep't of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 756-57 (1967).
7 Quill,504 U.S. at 312-21. For example, Justice Stevens noted the lack of a formal adoption of the physical presence standard in non-sales tax contexts, stating that "although our
Commerce Clause jurisprudence now favors more flexible balancing analyses, we have never
intimated a desire to reject all established 'bright-line' tests. Although we have not, in our
review of other types of taxes, articulated the same physical-presence requirement that Bellas
Hess established for sales and use taxes, that silence does not imply repudiation of the Bellas
Hess rule." Id. at 314. Justice Stevens echoed this sentiment later in the opinion, noting that
"although in our cases subsequent to Bellas Hess and concerning other types of taxes we have
not adopted a similar bright-line, physical-presence requirement, our reasoning in those cases
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the physical presence requirement, interpreting the requirement as only
applying to sales and use taxes.8 This interpretation, however, violates the
Commerce Clause and allows states to regulate interstate commerce, a
right that was clearly reserved to the federal government. 9The most recent
of these violations occurred in Revenue Cabinet v. Asworth Corp., where the
Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld a circuit court decision and subjected
a non-Kentucky business, with no physical presence in Kentucky, to
Kentucky state income taxes. 10
This Note presents the argument that the physical presence standard
has always applied, and still does apply, to all state taxes, and not just sales
and use taxes, and that the Supreme Court of the United States should grant
certiorari on the issue and clarify the confusion evidenced by conflicting
state courts and statutes. Part I contains a brief summary of the two cases
developing the physical presence standard, Bellas Hess and Quill, and
explains why even though those cases involved sales and use taxes, their
shared principle extends to all levels of state taxation." It contends that
Justices Stevens's ambiguous language in Quill has led several state courts
and legislatures throughout the United States to adopt laws that violate
the Commerce Clause, a trend that will continue to gain momentum as
technology expands the possibility of out-of-state sales. Part II examines
the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution," discussing the
development of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine and explaining
why the doctrine mandates a physical presence requirement. Part III
reviews legislative and judicial interpretations of the physical presence
requirement, focusing on the confusion displayed by the Kentucky Court
of Appeals in its recent Asworth decision. 3 Finally, Part IV discusses the
advancement of technology and its relationship to the Internet, explaining,

does not compel that we now reject the rule that Bellas Hess established in the area of sales
and use taxes" Id. at 317.
8 See, e.g., Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, Inc., 825 A.2d 399, 415-16 (Md. 2003);
Kmart Props., Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't of N.M., 13 1 P.3d 27,35 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001);
Couchot v. State Lottery Comm'n, 659 N.E.zd 1225, 1230 (Ohio 1996); Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C.
Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13, 18 (S.C. 1993).
9 See Gibbons v. Ogden, zz U.S. 1,3, 200-01 (1824).
io Revenue Cabinet v. Asworth Corp., No. zoo7-CA-oo2549-MR, 2oo9 Ky. App. LEXIS
229, at *i, *10-12 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 2o, 2oo9), cert.denied, 131 S.Ct. 1046 (zoi i).
ss Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. 753; Quill, 504 U.S. 298.
12 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl.
3.
13 Asworth Corp., 2oo9 Ky. App. LEXIS 229.
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through the use of a modern example, why-a bright-line test is exceedingly
important as technology capabilities expand.
I. THE

DEVELOPMENT

OF

THE

PHYSICAL

PRESENCE

REQUIREMENT:

BELuAs HEss AND QUILL
The physical presence test was originally developed to offer brightline guidance to states regarding what qualified as acceptable taxation of
out-of-state businesses. The Supreme Court first established the test in
Bellas Hess, 14 and later reaffirmed its application in Quill."
A. Bella Hess r Bright-LinePhysical PresenceRequirement
The physical presence requirement for out-of-state taxation originated
in NationalBellas Hess v. Departmentof Revenue, when a mail order house
operating out of Missouri challenged an Illinois use tax imposed because it
solicited Illinois customers with biannual mail catalogues.' 6 The taxpayer
had no physical presence in Illinois- as the Supreme Court stated:
[It] does not maintain in Illinois any office, distribution house,
sales house, warehouse or any other place of business; it does
not have in Illinois any agent, salesman, canvasser, solicitor or
other -type of representative to sell or take orders, to deliver
merchandise, to accept payments, or to service merchandise
it sells; it does not own any tangible property, real or personal,
in Illinois; it has no telephone listing in Illinois and it has not
advertised its merchandise for sale in newspapers, on billboards,
or by radio or television in Illinois."
The only contact that the taxpayer had with the state of Illinois was
that "[tiwice a year catalogues [were] mailed to the company's active
or recent customers throughout the [United States], including Illinois
... supplemented by advertising 'flyers."" 8 Despite this lack of contact,
Illinois classified the taxpayer as "a 'retailer maintaining a place of business
in [Illinois],"' causing it to be subject to the Illinois use tax.19
The Illinois Supreme Court allowed the tax, splitting its analysis
between the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment (focusing on whether "the exercise of in personam
jurisdiction by the circuit court deprived [the taxpayer] of due process of

14 Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758.
15 Quill, 504 U.S. at 306-07.

16 Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 753-55.
17 id. at 754.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 755.
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law" since the taxpayer had minimal connections to the taxing state).,0
In an opinion authored by Justice Stewart, however, the Supreme Court
reversed, finding that the tax was unconstitutional because it violated both
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce
Clause."' The Court determined that permitting a state to tax entities with
no physical presence in that state presented an unconstitutional burden
on interstate commerce, noting that "the Court has never held that a State
may impose the duty of use tax collection and payment upon a seller
whose only connection with customers in the State is by common carrier
or the United States mail."22 It explained that "[tihe many variations in
rates of tax, in allowable exemptions, and in administrative and recordkeeping requirements could entangle [the taxpayer's] interstate business
in a virtual welter of complicated obligations to local jurisdictions with no
legitimate claim to impose a 'fair share of the cost of local government."'2 3
Upon reflection, these justifications make logical sense: because it is nearly
impossible for a business to keep track of every jurisdiction it sells products
in, a physical presence test is, if nothing else, a product of simplification.
The Court never explicitly stated that it was creating a "physical
presence test." Its holding that the outer limit of taxation would be a
situation in which the taxpayer had "10 wholesalers, jobbers, or 'salesmen'
conducting continuous local solicitation in [the taxing state]," combined
with its emphasis on the taxpayer's lack of physical presence in Illinois,
clearly indicated that the Court intended to establish a physical presence
standard. 4 The purpose of this test was consistent with the purpose of
the Commerce Clause: "to ensure a national economy free from such
unjustifiable local entanglements. Under the Constitution, this is a
domain where Congress alone has the power of regulation and control."2 "
Permitting the states to impinge on this exclusive province undermines
the Constitution and grants states greater taxing authority than the drafters
of the Constitution ever intended.
B. Justice Stevens's Ambiguous Language in Quill
For twenty-five years, courts embraced the ruling in Bellas Hess that
required a taxpayer to have physical presence in a state before it could
be subject to taxation by that state. 6 In 1992, the Supreme Court granted
2o Dep't of Revenue v. Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc.,
CONsT. amend. XIV, § i.
21 Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 760.
22

Id. at 758.

23
24

Id. at 759-60 (citations omitted).
Id. at 757-58.

25

Id. at 760.

214

N.E.2d 755, 76o-62 (I11.1966); U.S.

z6 See, e.g., Ind.-Ky. Elec. Corp. v. Ind. Dep't of State Revenue, 598 N.E.2d 647 (Ind.
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certiorari to a similar case, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.7 The facts in Quill
were not entirely unlike those in Bellas Hess: The taxpayer was "an out-ofstate mail-order house ... [with] neither outlets nor sales representatives
in the State." 8 The Rehnquist Court reversed the North Dakota Supreme
Court. In an opinion authored by Justice Stevens, the Court upheld the
physical presence requirement established in Bellas Hess.z9 The opinion,
however, cast some doubt as to whether the physical presence requirement
applied to all taxes or just sales and uses taxes. This confusion resulted
from Justice Stevens's comment that:
[Allthough in our cases subsequent to Bellas Hess and concerning
other types of taxes we have not adopted a similar bright-line,
physical-presence requirement, our reasoning in those cases
does not compel that we now reject the rule that Bellas Hess
established in the area of sales and use taxes."30
Because both Bellas Hess and Quill involved sales and use taxes, Justice
Stevens's statement suggested the possibility that the physical presence
requirement only existed for sales and use taxes.
Proponents of the elimination of the physical presence test argue that
Quill overruled Bellas Hess, limiting the physical presence test to sales and
use taxes.31 But Justice Stevens's opaque statement was dicta at best, since
the Court ruled that the tax in question in Quill was unconstitutional due
to the taxpayer's lack of physical presence.3" The Court's decision in Quill
should not have represented a substantial departure in the law, as it merely
reapplied the preexisting Bellas Hess standard. Because of the court's unclear
language, however, various state courts since 1992 have interpreted Quill
to overturn Bellas Hess, limiting the physical nexus standard to sales and
use taxes.33 The confusion among state courts as to what Quill means was
recently displayed in Revenue Cabinetv.Asworth Corp., where the Kentucky
Court of Appeals stated that "the applicability of Quill's physical presence
1992) (analogizing connections made through electric wires to mail-order subscriptions in an
income tax case); SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Bannon, 585 A.zd 666 (Conn. 1991) (ruling that
a use tax was unconstitutional as applied due to lack of physical presence); Evanston Ins. Co.
v. Merin, 598 F. Supp. 1290 (D. N.J. 1984) (holding that the physical presence test was satisfied
by the taxpayers connections to the state in an income tax dispute); Nat'l Liberty Life Ins.
Co. v. State, 215 N.W.zd z6 (Wis. 1974) (finding that there was sufficient physical presence to
justify the imposition of a general revenue tax).
27 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
28 Id. at 3oi.
29 Id. at 31 7 -19 .
30 Id. at 317.
31 See, e.g., Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13, 18 (S.C. 1993) ("It is well
settled that the taxpayer need not have a tangible, physical presence in a state for income to
be taxable there. The presence of intangible property alone is sufficient to establish nexus.").
32 See Quill,504 U.S. at 317-19.
33 Supra note 8.
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requirement to income tax cases, such as the matter before us, is unclear,"
then subsequently chose to invalidate the physical presence test.34 The
court's actions represent the chaos that courts face when interpreting Quill,
which, while never actually changing the law, has cast doubt on the viability
of the physical presence requirement in non-sales and use tax situations.
II. ExAMINING THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

A. Development of the Dormant Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause states that Congress shall have power "[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes. ' 3 While the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is implicated when considering issues involving
discrimination in interstate commerce, the Supreme Court in Quill focused
36
primarily on the Commerce Clause, which is the focus of this Note.
On its face, the Commerce Clause does not involve state taxation at all.
The provision itself is a federal constitutional phrase enumerating a power
of the federal government. Records of the Constitutional Convention,
however, indicate that the drafters of the Constitution intended for the
Commerce Clause to limit state regulation of commerce. 37 The Supreme
Court recognized the drafters' intentions in the landmark decision, Gibbons
v. Ogden, where the Court held that:
In each of those proceedings [of the Constitutional Convention],
it was clearly contemplated, that the individual States should at
least retain the power of absolutely prohibiting the importation
of any article they thought fit, within their own respective limits.
How far was this intention subsequently departed from?
... [Wihen a State proceeds to regulate commerce with foreign
nations, or among the several States, it is exercising the very
power that is granted to Congress, and is doing the very thing
which Congress is authorized to do.
*.*[T]hat a State might impose duties on exports and imports, if
not expressly forbidden, will be conceded; but that it follows as
a consequence, from this concession, that a State may regulate

34 Revenue Cabinet v. Asworth Corp., No. 2007-CA-002549-MR, 2oo9 Ky. App. LEXIS
229, at 0 ii (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2009), cert.denied, 131 S. Ct. 1o46 (2Ol I).
35 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
36 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 305.

37 Martin, Statement at the Federal Constitutional Convention (June 19, 1787), in 2 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 483 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
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commerce38with foreign nations and among the States, cannot be
admitted.
Since its decision in Gibbons, the Supreme Court has emphasized the
importance of preventing states from regulating interstate commerce. As
it recently explained in Department of Revenue v. Davis (a case that, like
Asworth, arose from the Kentucky Court of Appeals):
The Commerce Clause empowers Congress "to regulate
Commerce ... among the several States," and although its
terms do not expressly restrain "the several States" in any way,
we have sensed a negative implication in the provision since
the early days. The modern law of what has come to be called
the dormant Commerce Clause is driven by concern about
"economic protectionism-that is, regulatory measures designed
to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state
competitors." The point is to "effectuat[e] the Framers' purpose39
to 'prevent a State from retreating into.., economic isolation.'
As this opinion displays, the dormant Commerce Clause remains a valid
doctrine, necessitating a bright-line test to protect its viability in the
taxation context.
B. Eliminatingthe PhysicalPresence Test Endangersthe Dormant Commerce
Clause
Allowing a state to tax a corporation with no physical presence within
the state allows that state to regulate interstate commerce. Judges that
have declined to impose a physical presence requirement have typically
supported their rejection of the test by arguing that a corporation receiving
income from a state takes advantage of that state's laws, meaning that the
corporation should be required to pay taxes on that benefit.' While this
argument may be tempting, it ignores a critical underlying fact: Corporations
4
are already required to pay income taxes in their home state. '
The question might be raised: Why is physical presence the only test that
satisfies the Commerce Clause? Admittedly, other tests could potentially
38 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1,1 33-34, 199-201 (1824).

39 Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337-38 (2008) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
40 See, e.g., Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.zd 13, 16 (S.C. 1993) ("By electing to license its trademarks and trade names for use by Toys R Us in many states, Geoffrey contemplated and purposefully sought the benefit of economic contact with those states.
Geoffrey has been aware of, consented to, and benefitted from Toys R Us's use of Geoffrey's
intangibles in South Carolina. Moreover, Geoffrey had the ability to control its contact with
S6uth Carolina by prohibiting the use of its intangibles here as it did with other states.").
41 See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 141.040 (West 2010), which provides that
(i) Every corporation doing business in this state, except those corporations
listed in [KRS 141.o4o(I)(a) through (i)l shall pay for each taxable year a tax ...
on taxable net income ...
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satisfy constitutional standards. The pragmatism of physical presence,
however, makes it a logical.choice. It avoids the pitfalls of a minimum
contacts test because courts are not forced to answer, and parties are not
forced to guess, what constitutes "minimum contacts." And proponents
of the elimination of the physical presence test are curiously silent when
given the possibility to provide a practical and logical test that would satisfy
the Commerce Clause-the absence of logical alternatives makes physical
presence the only reasonable option.
Stating the obvious, if a corporation is not physically located in one
specific state, it will be located in a different state. This simple logical
inference opens the door to yet another problem with eliminating physical
presence: to tax a corporation on the same income in one state (its state
of location) as well as a state in which it has no physical presence opens
the door for double taxation. As tax scholars have noted, "the principle
that the Commerce Clause requires states to avoid double taxation by
apportioning the tax obligations of actors in interstate commerce has, as
a theoretical matter, proved relatively uncontroversial .... On a visceral
level, double taxationis a badthing."42 The purpose of the Commerce Clause
is to leave interstate commercial regulation in the hands of the United
States Congress; the physical presence rule strengthens this principle
by restricting states' taxing authority to entities that are present within
the state. The Supreme Court itself admits that the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine has weakened from the drafters' intentions.43 It is time that
the Court draws a clear line to strengthen a principle that was essential to
the drafters of the Constitution: the ability of the federal government, and
not state governments, to regulate interstate commerce. 44 And it is obvious

(6) For taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 2007, the following rates
shall apply:
(a) Four percent (4%) of the first fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) of taxable
net income;
(b) Five percent (5%) of taxable net income over fifty thousand dollars
($50,000) up to one hundred thousand dollars ($1oo,ooo); and

(c) Six percent (6%) of taxable net income over one hundred thousand dollars

($1oo,ooo).
Clearly, a corporation would be "doing business" in Kentucky if it operated or distributed out
of Kentucky.
42
Edward A. Zelinsky, Rethinking Tax Nexus and Apportionment: Voice, Exit, and the
DormantCommerce Clause, 28 VA. TAX REV. 1,31 (20o8) (emphasis added).
43 See Gregory R. Evans, Comment, SeparateBut Taxed: A Rejection of the SireamlinedSales
Tax Project Through a Commerce Clauseand FederalistAnalysis, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 421, 441 ("The
Court itself has admitted that the strength of the dormant Commerce Clause, however, has
vacillated during the Court's history." (citing Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S.
175, 18o (1995))).
44 Martin, supranote 37.
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after reviewing the Constitution and case law interpreting it that this line
must be physical presence.
C. Getting (a Little Bit) Physical
Once it is established that some measure of physical presence is required
to subject an out-of-state corporation to state taxes, the logical follow-up
question is how much physical presence is required. Unsurprisingly, given
the state of ambiguity in the law, the Supreme Court has not established a
bright-line test that states exactly how much physical presence is required
to satisfy the dormant Commerce Clause; however, piecing together the
Court's language in Bellas Hess and Quill along with various lower court
decisions gives some indication as to what the test might be.
The first place to look to determine what degree of physical presence
the Commerce Clause mandates is the Supreme Court's original Bellas
Hess opinion. In Bellas Hess, the Court found that interactions with a state
through "the United States mail or a common carrier" did not qualify as
physical presence.4" The Court indicated that some examples of physical
presence would be the operation of a physical plant," presence of company
48
47
of employees in the state, the ownership of tangible property in the state,
or the presence of distinct intangibles, such as a state phone number listing
49
or directed advertising through state media outlets.
Examining all of the various examples of what does satisfy physical
presence indicates that it is a lenient standard. For example, state courts
have acknowledged that "[wihile a physical presence is required ... it need
not be substantial."50 The presence of an employee within a state is almost
assuredly enough to satisfy the physical presence test,"1 potentially even if
45 Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 754 (1967).
46 Id. ("[National] does not maintain in Illinois any office, distribution house, sales
house, warehouse, or any other place of business." (alteration in original)).
47 Id. ("[National] does not have in Illinois any agent, salesman, canvasser, solicitor or
other type of representative to sell or take orders, to deliver merchandise, to accept payments,
or to service merchandise it sells.").
48 Id. ("[National] does not own any tangible property, real or personal, in Illinois.").
49 Id. ("[National] has no telephone listing in Illinois and it has not advertised its merchandise for sale in newspapers, on billboards, or by radio or television in Illinois.").
50 See Magnetek Controls, Inc. v. Revenue Div., Dep't of Treasury, 562 N.W.zd 219, 223
(Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (alteration in original) (quoting In re Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal,
654 N.E.2d 954, 96o-6I (N.Y. 1995)).
51 See, e.g., Gillette Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 497 N.W.zd 595, 6oo (Mich. Ct. App. 1993)
(finding that employing a workforce in the state establishes sufficient physical presence to
impose a "single business" tax); Telebright Corp. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 25 N.J. Tax 333,
350-51 (N.J. Tax Ct. 2010) (holding that a single employee doing business within the state
satisfies the Commerce Clause); Galland Henning Nopak, Inc. v. Combs, 317 S.W.3d 841,
844-46 (Tex. App. 2010) (finding that a single employee's activities were sufficient physical
presence to satisfy Quill).
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that employee is merely a "part-time independent contractor-salesman.""2
Likewise, the physical transportation of goods by a company generally
constitutes physical presence within the state to which the company
delivers.53 Physical presence, on the other hand, does not exist in situations
where a corporation maintains only an intangible presence within a state,
such as mailing solicitations to customers within the state. s4 These decisions
indicate that if a corporation maintains any physical presence within a state,
however miniscule that presence is, it will be subject to that state's taxes.
While this is a rather lenient standard, however, the "bright-line regime
that [physical presence] establishes is unqualifiedly in its favor" because it
is the only standard that can satisfy the Commerce Clause. 5
11.

NEITHER COURTS NOR LEGISLATURES AGREE WHAT QUILL ACTUALLY

MEANS

Courts have interpreted Quill in one of two ways: Quill either (1)
reaffirms Bellas Hesss6 or (2) obliterates it. 7 Several courts have interpreted
Quill to uphold Bellas Hess, imposing a physical nexus requirement on
all types of out-of-state taxation. For example, the Tennessee Court
of Appeals' opinion in J.C. Penney National Bank v. Johnson clearly and
explicitly rejected the argument that the physical presence requirement
is limited to sales and use taxes.5 8 In J.C. Penney, the state of Tennessee
imposed a franchise tax on a bank that had no physical presence within
Tennessee. Tennessee taxed the bank because it had performed marketing
services aimed at causing Tennessee customers to sign up for the bank's
credit card. Explaining the delineation between the Due Process Clause
and the Commerce Clause, the court explained that, while the Due Process
Clause does not necessarily require physical presence, the Commerce
Clause does. 9 Interpreting Quill,60 the court explained that:
[T]o satisfy the Commerce Clause, [presence must] be more
than merely "doing business" in the State of Tennessee.... Both
52 J.W Hobbs Corp. v. Revenue Div., Dep't of Treasury, 706 N.W.2d 460, 468 (Mich.

Ct. App. 2005) (remanding to the trial court to determine if such an employee would cause a
corporation to have physical presence).
53 See Saudi Ref., Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 715 A.2d 89, 96-97 (Del. Super. Ct. 1998).
54 See J.C. Penney Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 19 S.W.3d 83 1, 839-42 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
55 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298,'321 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56 Guardian Indus. Corp. v. Dep't of Treasury, 499 N.W.2d 349, 376 (Mich. Ct. App.
j993); Rylander v. Bandag Licensing Corp., 18 S.W.3d 296, 298-300 (Tex. App. 2ooo).
57 Supra note 8.
58 J.C.Penney Nat'lBank, 19 S.W3d at 839.
59 Id. at 836-37.
60 In Quill, the court emphasized that the lack of a physical presence requirement for
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BellasHess and Quill are clear in their holding that in the context
of a use tax, physical presence is required in order to satisfy
the substantial nexus requirement .... While it is true that the
Bellas Hess and Quill decisions focused on use taxes, we find no

basis for concluding that the analysis should be different in the

present case. In fact, the Commissioner is unable to provide any
authority as to why
61 the analysis should be different for franchise
and excise taxes.
Several states, including Texas and Michigan, have agreed with Tennessee

and have limited state taxes to entities with a physical presence within the
state.6 A majority of courts, however, have chosen to ignore the Court's
language in Bellas Hess, interpreting Quill as opening the door for taxation
of all non-sales and use taxes, regardless of an entity's physical presence in
the state.3
A. The Kentucky Court of Appeals' MisguidedAttempt at Interpretation
The Kentucky Court of Appeals most recently addressed the physical
presence standard Revenue Cabinet v. Asworth, Corp., where the court
concluded that Quill overruled Bellas Hess and eliminated the physical
presence requirement. 64 In Asworth, the plaintiffhad filed Kentucky
corporate income tax returns despite the fact that it lacked a physical
presence in Kentucky.6 Asworth did however own a ninety-nine percent
share of the tobacco company Conwood Company, LP, which operated
in Kentucky. 66 Asworth argued that the taxes it paid should be refunded

Due Process analysis does not affect the physical presence requirement for Commerce Clause
analysis. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 305-06.
If there is a want of due process to sustain the tax, by that fact alone any burden
the tax imposes on the commerce among the states becomes 'undue.' But, though
overlapping, the two conceptions are not identical. There may be more than sufficient factual connections, with economic and legal effects, between the transaction
and the taxing state to sustain the tax as against due process objections. Yet it may
fall because of its burdening effect upon the commerce. And, although the two
notions cannot always he separated, clarity of consideration and of decision would
be promoted if the two issues are approached, where they are presented, at least
tentatively as if they were separate and distinct, not intermingled ones.

Id. (quoting Int'l Harvester Co. v. Dep't of Treasury of Ind., 322 U.S. 340, 353 (1944)).
6I J.C. Penney Nat'lBank, 19 S.W.3d at 839.
62 See Guardian Indus. Corp. v. Dep't of Treasury, 499 N.W.zd 349, 377-79 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1993); Rylander v. Bandag Licensing Corp., 18 S.W.3d 296, 300 (Tex. App. 2000).
63 See supra note 8.
64 Revenue Cabinet v. Asworth Corp., No. 2007-CA-002 5 4 9 -MR, 2oo9 Ky. App. LEXIS
229 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1046 (2011).
65 Id. at *2, *4-5.
66 Id. at *2-3.
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because Asworth's only presence within Kentucky was an investment in a
partnership that it did not control or manage.67
In evaluating whether Asworth had a sufficient nexus to be taxed under
Kentucky law, the court noted the vagueness of the Quill opinion, stating
that:
In addressing the sales and use taxes at issue in Quill, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed its previous bright-line rule that
"a vendor whose only contacts with the taxing State are by
mail or common carrier lacks the 'substantial nexus' required
by the Commerce Clause." However, the Supreme Court
recognized that it had not articulated the same physicalpresence requirement in reviewing other types of taxes. Thus,
the applicability- of Quill's physical presence requirement to income
tax cases, such as the matter before us, is unclear.'
Despite recognizing the lack of clarity in the law, the court concluded that
Asworth's presence in Kentucky was one satisfying the Commerce Clause,
stating that "even if a substantial nexus requires a physical presence in
Kentucky, for the reasons stated hereafter, we hold that [Asworth] in fact
[has] such a nexus."69 The court, however,.was unable to find any physical
presence, ultimately establishing Asworth's nexus with Kentucky as being
based on the fact that:
[W]hile the Corporations do no business in Kentucky, at various
times they have owned up to a 99% limited and/or general
partnership interest in, and have received distributive shares
of partnership income from the profits of, a partnership which
does business in Kentucky. Such a partnership unquestionably
has received protection and benefits from Kentucky, thereby
enabling the distribution of income to the Corporations. We
hold that this connection gives rise to a substantial
nexus with,
70
and/or a physical presence within, Kentucky.
The problem with this application is that ownership of a partnership
interest does not constitute physical presence in any way-as the Supreme
Court said in Bellas Hess, an example of "the furthest constitutional reach"
of a state's power to tax out-of-state entities is one where at least some
representatives of the taxpayer physically enter the state. 7" Merely owning
a share of a partnership within a state clearly falls short of this physical
7
presence standard.
It is one thing for a lower court to establish law when the Supreme
Court has left an issue unstated; it is quite another for a lower court to
67 Id. at *7.
68 Id. at * i I(emphasis added) (citations omitted).

69 Id. at *I 1-12.
70 Id. at *1z.
71 Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 757-58 (1967).
72 Id. While it is true that a ninety-nine percent share in a corporation is clearly greater

20II-2012]

COMMON SENSE COMMERCE CLAUSE

be left guessing as to what the Supreme Court meant when it issued an
opinion. Yet, the Kentucky Court of Appeals admitted to guessing the intent
of Congress, stating that "the applicability of Quilfs physical presence
requirement ... is unclear."73 It is not enough for courts to play guessing
games to determine what the Supreme Court intended, but this is exactly
what the court did in Asworth. And the court's lone foundation for upholding
the tax on Asworth-that Asworth had taken advantage of Kentucky's laws
and protections-fails when extrapolated to other situations arising as
74
technology increases and furthers corporations' out-of-state reach.
Removing the physical presence requirement from taxation leaves
taxpayers with a test that is analogous to the "minimum contacts" test
for personal jurisdiction.7" This test is problematic because scholars have
long criticized application of the minimum contacts test in the personal
jurisdiction context for its "ambiguity and incoherence."76 This problem
magnifies when applied to Internet corporations; as technology evolves
and more corporations adopt an Internet presence, scholars increasingly
emphasize the importance of physical presence in the personal jurisdiction
context.77 In other words, as legal scholars embrace physical presence in
other contexts due to the clarity it provides, courts are moving farther away
from physical presence in taxation settings. It is simply inexcusable for
courts to be left in such a state of confusion, but it is an even bigger problem
that these confused courts are creating unconstitutional precedents that
will cause conflicts for decades in the absence of Supreme Court guidance.
B. Case Closed... Or Not
At least one commentator has remarked that the Supreme Court's denial
of certiorari thus far regarding the physical presence test signifies that the
Court will likely review the physical presence requirement in the future.78
than a single share, this does not change the fact that the court has established a physical presence requirement. The justification of the physical presence requirement - to prevent states
from over-reaching by establishing a bright-line standard - exists, regardless of the degree of
ownership (whether one share or ninety-nine percent) maintained in a corporation.
73 Asworth Corp., 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 229, at *51 (emphasis added).
74 See infra Part IVA (explaining why the mere fact that a corporation has a connection to
a state is entirely insufficient to conclude that the corporation is protected by the state's laws).
75 See supra note 42.
76 See Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, andMinimum Contacts: Toward a Mixed Theory
of PersonalJurisdiction, io8 YALE L.J. I89, 189 (1998) (noting that "[aimbiguity and incoherence have plagued the minimum contacts test for the more than five decades during which it
has served as a cornerstone of the Supreme Court's personal jurisdiction doctrine").
77 See Tricia Leigh Gray, Minimum Contactsin Cyberspace:The ClassicJurisdictionAnalysis in
a New Setting, i.J. HIGH TECH. L. 85, 88-89 (2002).
78 See Robert Willens, Iowa Supreme Court Disputes Need for 'Physical Presence,' BUREAU
NAT'L AFF., TAX & AccT. CTR. (Nov. 7, 2011), http://taxandaccounting.bna.com/btac/display/
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One could argue that the Court's denial to resolve the issue indicates that
the state of the law is becoming clearer and that certiorari is not required.
When recent judicial opinions are examined, however, it is impossible to
avoid the fact that courts have consistently demonstrated confusion as to
the appropriate standard. A comparison of two recent opinions filed within
days of each other exemplifies this point.
On December 22, 2010, the Virginia Deputy Tax Commissioner
issued a ruling suggesting that physical presence was a key (and perhaps
mandatory) element in determining whether an out-of-state corporation
could be subjected to Virginia state income tax.79 The taxpayer in question
was a parent corporation of four subsidiaries - it had "no property or payroll
in Virginia," and its only connection to the state was that it "own[ed] and
manage[d] certain intangible assets (trademarks, patents, manufacturing
know-how, and other intellectual property)" used in the state.8"
The Tax Commissioner ruled that there was insufficient nexus for the
state to tax the corporation. It first cited Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax
Commission,8 noting that in South Carolina, an intangible holding corporation
• can have sufficient nexus taxation "through the licensing of intangible
property within the state."8 " The ruling, however, contrasted this decision
with Virginia law, stating that "[e]ven if the Taxpayer's intangible assets
were to establish nexus with Virginia, the facts provided raise the question
as to whether the Taxpayer would have any Virginia source income. The
.Taxpayer has no property or payroll in Virginia."83 While the ruling stopped
short of explicitly requiring physical presence, the fact that the court cited
Geoffrey as a contradictory case and ruled in favor of the taxpayer suggests
that the ruling intended a physical presence requirement.
While the Virginia Tax Commission Ruling implied that physical
presence may be required, but stopped short of actually saying so, the
Washington Supreme Court's ruling in Lamtec Corp. v. Dep'tof Revenue, two
weeks later, did the exact opposite: It implied that physical presence is
probably not required, yet went on to apply a physical presence analysis.'
In Lamtec, the taxpayer was a New Jersey corporation appealing the
enforcement of a Washington business and occupation tax.8" The taxpayer

batch-print-display.adp (search "Robert Willens"; then follow "Iowa Supreme Court Disputes Need for 'Physical Presence"' hyperlink) (discussing the Iowa Supreme Court's controversial decision to eliminate the physical presence test in KFC Corp. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue,
792 N.W.2d 308 (Iowa 20o0), and the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari).
79 Tax Comm'r Rul. 10-279, at *2 (Va. Dec. 22, 2010).
8o Id. at *i.
81 Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993).
82 Tax Comm'r Rul. 10-279, at *3-4 (Va. Dec. 22, 2010).
83 Id. at *4.
84 See Lamtec v. Dep't of Revenue, 246 P.3d 788, 792-95 (Wash. zoI).
85 Id. at 790.

2011-20121

COMMON SENSE COMMERCE CLAUSE

had no offices, addresses, phone numbers, or employees in Washington, but
it sent representatives to Washington "[a]bout two or three times a year."'
The court suggested that it believed Quill did not require physical
presence, stating that "[the Supreme Court] has not held that an established
sales force (or a physical presence) is a requirementto establish the requisite
nexus [for taxation]. '87 It noted that "the United States Supreme Court
itself has cast some doubt on the reach of the physical presence test it
established in the sales and use context"' and that "[tihere is also extensive
language in Quill that suggests the physical presence requirement should
be restricted to sales and use taxes. ' 89 Despite its clear belief that physical
presence was not required, the court nevertheless felt the necessity to
conduct a physical presence analysis, ultimately concluding the taxpayer's
"practice of sending sales representatives to meet with its customers within
Washington" was sufficient to expose them to state taxation. 9°
Two differing opinions were issued within one month of each other
involving physical presence. In one, a Tax Commissioner acknowledged
that physical presence was a major element, without explicitly establishing
it as the mandatory test,91 and in the other, a state Supreme Court noted
that physical presence probably was not required, but felt it necessary to
conduct a physical presence analysis anyway.9 To put it simply: courts are
confused. Courts feel unable to issue definite rulings and are applying tests
that may or may not be required by the Constitution. Guidance by the
Supreme Court is more than needed - it is necessary.
C. Send in the Legislators
Of course, without legislation enabling unconstitutional taxation, there
would not be an issue of judicial interpretation. The Supreme Court has
stated that the goal of its judicial decisions is consistency, noting that "[iun
reviewing Commerce Clause challenges to state taxes, our goal has ... been
to 'establish a consistent and rational method of inquiry' focusing on the
'practical effect of a challenged tax.' 93 The Court has partially met its goal:
since Quill, state legislatures have been consistently confused.
Since Quill, an interesting trend has emerged that further emphasizes
this point. At the time of the Supreme Court's ruling on Quill, thirty-six
states (seventy-two percent) had tax laws that allowed states to tax out86
87
88
89

Id.

Id.at

792.

Id. at 793.
Id. at 794.
90 Id. at 795.
91 SeeTax Comm'r Rul. 10-279, at *2-3 (Va. Dec. 22, 2010).
92 See Lamtec, 246 P.3d at 792-95.
93 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 615 (1981).
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of-state entities with no physical presence. 94 After Quill one of two things
should have happened: (1) Quill's reaffirmation of the physical presence
test should have superseded these statutes, making them unenforceable;
or (2) the remaining fourteen states should have expanded their own
legislation to allow for taxation. Surprisingly (or perhaps unsurprisingly,
given the ambiguous nature of Quill), neither of these occurred.
. Instead, state legislation in the wake of Quill remains largely the
same. In 2010, according to a survey conducted by the Bureau of National
Affairs, 9 twenty-five states did not base their state nexus policy on physical
presence,96 fourteen states (plus the District of Columbia) based their state
nexus policy on physical presence, 97 one state answered "depends,"98 and
ten states did not respond or did not participate in the survey.99 This shows
that, since 1992 (when the Supreme Court decided Quill), between fifty
percent 10 and seventy percent 0 1 of the states still do not require physical
presence and at least thirty percent of the states still do. This raises the
question: why?
Why would a state not tax an entity to the fullest extent allowed by law?
The answer is obvious: no one can say with any definiteness what the full
extent of the law actually is.
IV.

THE EVOLUTION OF TECHNOLOGY AND THE INCREASING NEED FOR

A BRIGHT-LINE TEST

The problem with eliminating the physical presence requirement for
taxation becomes clearer when considering the increasing capabilities of
modern technology. Parties on both sides of the nexus argument will agree
that some nexus requirement exists, whether it is physical presence or
some lower standard. But if physical nexus is no longer required and there
94 Laura A. Kulwicki, State Taxation of MailOrder Sellers: An End to the Nexus Wars?, I ST.
332, 332 (I991).
95 TAX MGMT., BUREAU NAT'L AFFAIRS, 2010 SURVEY OF STATE TAX DEPARTMENTS (George
R. Farrah et al. eds., 2010).
96 Those states were Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, and West Virginia. Id. at S-2o to S-21.
97 Those states were Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Texas, and Wisconsin. Id.
98 That state was New York; although, notably, New York City (which answered separately) answered that it did require physical presence. Id.at S-21.
99 Those states were Alabama, Alaska, California, Georgia, Kansas, Mississippi, Nevada,
South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming. Id.
at S-2o to -21.

TAx NOTES

1oo This assumes that none of the non-responsive states required physical presence.
1o This assumes that all of the non-responsive states required physical presence.
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is no bright-line test, the ambiguity opens the door for state taxation of
companies for the purchase of self-soliciting items, a threat that is alarming.
A. The Amazon Kindle:A ParadigmaticExample of the Needfor Legal
Clarityl02
It is no secret that Internet sales are dominating the economic
landscape. The convenience provided by Internet transactions combined
with the technological capabilities that companies are developing suggests
that Internet-ready devices will be around for the foreseeable future. Take,
for example, Amazon's popular Kindle e-reader device. A consumer using
a Kindle is free to order as many or as few books as they desire; there is no
quota and, essentially, no restrictions as to what a consumer may purchase.
When powered on, a Kindle displays a screen with a list of books and
applications owned by the user; there are no advertisements, and a separate
"store" must be entered before a consumer can purchase a book. In the
store, there is a small area where "recommended books" are listed, but there
are no pop-up advertisements, and the only books listed are ones that are
consistent with the buyer's purchasing history. In a world full of advertising,
Amazon seems uniquely eager to let the consumer order only that in which
he is actively interested, avoiding constant solicitation and advertisements.
Yet, if the physical presence requirement is eliminated, Amazon could (and
would) be subject to out-of-state income tax (in addition to Washington
state income tax, where it resides) on every purchase made in the Kindle
store. Is this fair?
Proponents of the elimination of the physical presence requirement
would argue that it is fair because Amazon is availing itself of the law in
which a purchaser lives - that it is, essentially, contracting within a state.
This argument's errors become glaring when examined. Kindle could
function without any advertisements, leaving the Internet connection
that consumers use to purchase the books as the only connection between
Amazon and the consumers." 3 If Amazon does not advertise within a state
and does not have a physical presence within a state, it would be unfair to
subject Amazon to the state's income taxes because it opens the door for
double- (or even triple-) taxation. Even the argument that the purchasers
1o2 The author relies predominantly his own personal experience with the Amazon Kindle throughout this section. The details of how a Kindle works can be found in the Kindle's
user manual. AMAZON, KINDLE USER'S GUIDE, http://s3.amazonaws.com/kindle/KindleUser_
Guide.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 20i2). Additionally, this analysis assumes for the sake of argument that Amazon has no physical presence in at least some states; the author acknowledges,
however, that due to the nature of Amazon's sales model, which involves extensive shipping
and distribution centers, such a state may not exist.
i03 Even this connection is tenuous because, with the expansion of networking capac-.
ity, a consumer living at a state's border could theoretically connect to the Internet using an
out-of-state connection.
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avail, themselves of a state's laws by making a purchase within the state
fails: Kindle users who purchase their Kindles from Amazon's website agree
to be bound by Washington state law.tI4 Disregarding the physical presence
test, however, a state would be able to collect income taxes from Amazon for
every book purchased in the Kindle store as long as the purchase originated
from the taxing state. Kindle is one of countless examples of popular devices
that allow for the online purchase of separate items without the business's
solicitation or advertisements, while offering no protection to the consumer
under the consumer's resident state law (other devices and services such as
Apple's popular iTunes store"' and Motorola's Android application store'0°
use forum limitation clauses similar to Amazon's).
Proponents of eliminating the physical presence requirement may
argue that even the limited amount of advertising provided by devices
such as the Kindle should expose corporations to state taxation. If limited
advertising within a state alone can establish essential nexus, where should
courts draw the line? Is a single advertisement within a state enough
to open the door to taxation? What about a single flyer? If the physical
presence test is abandoned and replaced with an obscure balancing test that
no person-and certainly not state courts, who are already in conflict over
the presence of a bright-line rule--can resolve with any consistency, the
potential for corporate tax liability will be endless. The need for a brightline, irrefutable test is clear: whether the Supreme Court chooses to adopt a
physical presence test or a different test, the current ambiguity of the law is
1o4 Amazon.com Help: Conditions of Use, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/
customer/display.html/ref=footercou?ie=UTF8&nodeld=5o8o88
(last updated Aug. 19,
201 I) ("By visiting Amazon.com, you agree that the Federal Arbitration Act, applicable federal law, and the laws of the state of Washington, without regard to principles of conflict of
laws, will govern these Conditions of Use and any dispute of any sort that might arise between
you and Amazon.").
105 iTunes Store Terms andConditions,APPLE, http://www.apple.com/legal/itunes/us/terms.
html#SALE (last visited Jan. 3, 2ol2) ("The iTunes Service is operated by Apple from its
offices in the United States. You agree to comply with all local, state, federal, and national
laws, statutes, ordinances, and regulations that apply to your use of the iTunes Service. All
transactions on the iTunes Service are governed by California law, without giving effect to its
conflict of law provisions. Your use of the iTunes Service may also be subject to other laws. You
expressly agree that exclusive jurisdiction for any claim or dispute with Apple or relating in
any way to your use of the iTunes Service resides in the courts in the State of California. Risk
of loss and title for all electronically delivered transactions pass to the purchaser in California
upon electronic transmission to the recipient. No Apple employee or agent has the authority
to vary this Agreement.").
io6 Site Terms of Service, ANDROID, http://www.android.com/terms.html (last updated Apr.
16, 2007) (on file with author) ("The Terms, and your relationship with Google under the
Terms, shall be governed by the laws of the State of California without regard to its conflict
of laws provisions. You and Google agree to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts
located within the county of Santa Clara, California to resolve any legal matter arising from the
Terms. Notwithstanding this, you agree that Google shall still be allowed to apply for injunctive remedies (or an equivalent type of urgent legal relief) in any jurisdiction.").
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inexcusable and will continue to cause confusion as technological abilities
advance even further.
B. The Main Street FairnessAct
The constitutionality of out-of-state taxation is more relevant today
than ever before due to the massive Internet retail market. In 2010, there
was an estimated $165.4 billion of retail sales generated from the Internet
alone. °7 While Internet sales transactions have historically not been subject
to taxation, the trend may be changing. In Amazon.com LLC v. New York
State Department of Taxation and Finance, plaintiff Amazon, a nationwide
retail distributor, sued the state of New York after being taxed on its sales
within the state."° Citing Quill,Amazon argued that it could not be subject
to a New York state tax because it lacked a substantial nexus with the state
of New York.l°9 The court skirted the issue of whether physical presence is
required; instead, it held that Amazon had physical presence within New
York, noting that:
Amazon contracts with thousands of associates that provided
it with a New York address.
Amazon chooses to benefit from New York associates that are
free to target New Yorkers and encourage Amazon sales, all the
while earning money for Amazon in return for which Amazon
pays them commissions. Amazon does not discourage its
associates from reaching out to customers or contributors and
pressing Amazon sales. " 0
While failing to directly address the issue of essential nexus, Amazon
raises an interesting, and constitutionally troubling question: can a state
impose a tax requirement on an out-of-state business merely because the
business sells to customers within the state? As discussed above, if Quill is
read to negate the physical presence requirement of out-of-state taxation,
the answer is almost certainly yes.
Indeed, legislators are already attempting to banish the physical presence
requirement, even for sales and use taxes. Twenty-four states have already
enacted statutes that "require tax payments for online transactions."n"A
recently proposed House Bill known as "The Main Street Fairness Act"
107

U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE, QUARTERLY RETAIL E-COMMERCE SALES
available at http://www.census.gov/retail/mrts/www/data/pdf/ec-

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,

4TH QUARTER 2010 (201 i1),

current.pdf.
io8 Amazon.com LLC v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 877 N.Y.S.2d 842, 846
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
109 Id. at 849.
ib Id.
iI1 Courtney Rubin, Isan Internet Sales Tax Coming Soon?, INC.COM, July 30, 201o, http://
www.inc.com/news/articles/zo o/07/bill-would-allow-Internet-sales-tax.html.
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seeks to extend such legislation to all states, allowing states "to require
all sellers not qualifying for the small seller exception to collect and remit
sales and use taxes with respect to remote sales sourced to that Member
State under the Agreement." 112 Application of the bill would allow states
to charge sales and use taxes on out-of-state businesses for sales made to
in-state customers, even if the business has no physical presence within
the states.
While the Commerce Clause would potentially allow legislation such
as The Main Street Fairness Act to be enacted by Congress, it would
specifically prevent states from implementing such legislation in the
absence of a federal enabling statute. State legislatures have no authority
to invoke taxes (sales, use, or otherwise) on an out-of-state entity with no
physical presence - such a tax would be unconstitutional under both Bellas
Hess and Quill."3 Additionally, as Congressman Paul W. Hodges (discussing
The Main Street Fairness Act) recently stated, state taxation of Internet
sales would be "burdensome," negating the effects the Internet has had to
'' 4
"further job creation and innovation."
Even though isolated legislators have attempted to overrule the physical
presence requirement in the past," 5 Congress has chosen to retain the
physical presence test for one significant reason: it makes sense. Entities
that sell over the Internet still pay taxes on those sales, in the form of state
income tax in the state in which they are located. To allow other states to
impose a tax opens the door to double taxation, greatly inhibiting retail
businesses in the midst of a severe recession. Allowing these taxes could
prove detrimental to the country's recovery, causing businesses to declare
bankruptcy and ultimately causing a larger negative impact on the states
than the positive benefits the taxes would otherwise create.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court was clear in Bellas Hess that states cannot
constitutionally impose a tax on an out-of-state entity that has no physical
presence within the state." 6 Since the Court's decision in Quill, state
legislators and courts have been in a state of confusion, making certiorari
necessary to clarify the state of the law. The Asworth opinion, in which
the Kentucky Court of Appeals essentially admitted to guessing what
the Supreme Court intended, demonstrates the alarming lack of clarity
112 H.R. 5660, i ith Cong. (zd Sess. 2010).
113 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. I, 199-200 (1824).
114 Rubin, supra note i 12.
i 5 See H.R. 2230, ioist Cong. (ist Sess. 1989); S. 480, 1ost Cong. (1989); S. 2368, ooth
Cong. (1988); H.R. 3521, iooth Cong. (1987); S. 1o99, iooth Cong. (1987); H.R. 3549, 99th
Cong. (1985); S. 983, 96th Cong. (979); S. 282, 93d Cong. (1973).
1i6 Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).
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that courts currently feel in interpreting what constitutes permissible
taxation." 7 Although the Supreme Court has established a test, the courts
and legislatures are confused as to the applicability of the test. Thus, it is
essential that the.Court grant certiorari to resolve the issue.
When the Court does grant certiorari to clarify the essential nexus
for out-of-state taxation, the test that the Court should apply is obvious:
it is the same test it has applied for thirty-four years, since its decision
in Bellas Hess. The reasons for requiring physical presence are clear: first,
and most importantly, the Commerce Clause requires such a test."' For
nearly 200 years, the Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted
the Commerce Clause to restrict states from regulating commerce
between the states. 119 To allow a state to impose a tax on a corporation
with no connection to the taxing state, merely because the corporation has
customers ordering from within the state, allows states to regulate the flow
of interstate commerce and imposes an unconstitutional burden on out-ofstate corporations.
Additionally, the physical presence test is required to establish a brightline rule for courts to apply in the future. The "minimum contacts" test
for personal jurisdiction is insufficient to provide courts with sufficient
guidance for when taxation is appropriate. As technology develops and
corporations find new ways to market and sell to customers, the need for
clarity in the law will grow. The Court can, and should, take this opportunity
to clarify the essential nexus standard to avoid endless future lawsuits.
The current state of the law is unclear. Neither courts nor legislatures
know what to do because several cases have obscured the line establishing
what is and is not unconstitutional taxation. It is time for the Court to grant
certiorari and reaffirm the validity of the physical presence test for out-ofstate taxation.

117 Revenue Cabinet v. Asworth Corp., No. 2007-CA-002549-MR, 2oo9 Ky. App. LEXIS
229, at *1I (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2009),cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1046 (2011 ).

118 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 3.
i 19 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 199-201

(1824).

